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1INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to review available evidence 
on the effects of tariff policy (especially tariff escalation 
and preferences) on fish product production structures, 
development outcomes, and fish stocks. The report consists 
of a qualitative review of available literature produced by 
international agencies — e.g. the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO); the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and 
the World Bank — nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
— e.g. Greenpeace and the International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD); and academics. The 
empirical focus is on wild caught fish and fish products, both 
for human and industrial uses (hereon ‘fish’). It does not 
include aquaculture products, because they have entirely 
different industrial structures, socio-economic relations, 
and socioecological effects than wild-caught fish. This is not 
to suggest an immutable division between the two sectors, 
because there are important interactions at (and between) 
the points of production (e.g. wild caught fish processed into 
fish meal is often used in aquaculture) and consumption (e.g. 
market competition and product substitutability among wild 
caught and aquaculture fish).
Despite the existence of a vast literature on fishing industries 
around the world, very little is known about the effects of 
fish tariff liberalization (Kurien 2005 is a notable exception). 
However, a general study of ‘fish’ tariffs would obscure as 
much as it might reveal because, as Roheim (2004) points 
out, species and product differentiation is crucial. As such, 
this report focuses largely on the specific dynamics of the 
production and international trade of canned tuna. Given the 
focus of the terms of reference on development, the report 
focuses on countries (self) categorized as ‘developing’ and on 
those categorized by the United Nations (UN) Committee for 
Development Policy as least-developed countries (LDCs).
TARIFF ESCALATION AND 
TARIFF PREFERENCES: 
PERSPECTIVES
PRO-LIBERALIZERS 
Orthodox liberalizers
The standard argument for the liberalization of barriers to 
trade and investment in fisheries (as with other sectors) is 
that “the most cost effective producers with a comparative 
advantage [should] undertake the operation” (Schmidt 
2003: 7; see also Heydon 2006). Therefore, rather than see 
fish populations as a national resource to be extracted by 
nationals, governments should resist resource nationalism 
and open extraction to international competition. In many 
cases, and especially where a developing economy is small 
and undiversified, the logic of this argument is extended 
to claim that the only assumed comparative advantage 
is the generation of rents from fishing licenses; any other 
interventions adopted by states, such as industrial policies 
requiring foreign companies to invest locally to qualify for 
fishing licenses, will only stall or pervert growth (Duncan 
2006; Peterson 2006).1 
The OECD states that “[r]educing tariff escalation will 
generate further opportunities for developing countries 
through their participation in international trade of value-
added fish products” and that “[t]he liberalisation of tariffs 
and reductions in peaks and escalation [will] ensure fair 
access to markets for processed products” (2010: 68; for 
similar statements, see WTO 1997; ICTSD 2006; Martini and 
Lindberg 2013). The assertion that the liberalization of tariffs 
alone will allow ‘fair’ access is problematic given the layers of 
other barriers to developing country market access, including 
the multitude of fisheries subsidies and non-tariff barriers 
applied by OECD governments and the buying power and 
private standards of branded firms and big retail.2 As tariffs 
(and thus tariff preferences) fall in major markets, non-tariff 
measures — particularly public and private sustainability 
and food safety standards — are likely to become the main 
barriers to market access for fish products. Especially for 
those smaller players — including small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and fiscally squeezed states — that are 
For a critical engagement with contemporary conceptions of rent in 
fisheries, see Campling and Havice (2014c).
As Mbithi (2006b: 150) points out, the proliferation of standards 
“increase[s] the cost of doing business, which in turn necessitates increased 
catches, hence encouraging disregard for stock conversation measures.”
1
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2less able to spread the costs of investment required to 
comply with such measures. Dealing with these barriers 
will be the key to helping preference-receiving countries 
maintain competitiveness as preference margins fall. While 
the OECD’s argument on tariff escalation and peaks may be 
appropriate for some developing countries, the dependence 
of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and 
others on preferences for fish products makes it clear that 
this is not the case for all (see below). Interestingly, faced 
even with very high tariff peaks, several developing countries 
successfully penetrate protected markets, as Southeast Asian 
canned tuna exports to the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US) markets make clear. In short, in discussing 
the benefits of liberalization of fish tariffs to ‘developing 
country’ producers, it is essential to differentiate among 
them.
A common response to ACP preference dependence is 
the argument of the ‘preference pessimists.’ This is the 
dominant narrative of ACP-EU trade relations in mainstream 
trade and development policy circles. Assessments from 
this perspective tend to use highly aggregated data to 
conclude that Lomé preferences failed to stimulate industrial 
development in ACP economies (Davenport et al. 1995; Moss 
and Ravenhill 1987). A commonly cited statistic to support 
this view is the decline in ACP goods as a proportion of total 
EU imports from 13.3 percent in 1976 to 3.7 percent in 2000 
(Yu and Jensen 2005). In general, ACP economies did not 
diversify, and their export portfolios remained dominated 
by unprocessed primary commodities and some low value-
added agricultural products. For example, in 1999, only 
9 products constituted 57 percent of total ACP exports 
to the EU, and, of 77 ACP countries, 61 percent of total 
exports came from only 10 African economies (DG TRADE 
and DG DEV 2002). From the theoretical perspective of 
mainstream economics, preferences pervert opportunity 
costs, constraining the most efficient allocation of resources 
and actually discourage economies from diversifying, owing 
to dependence on preferences (Davenport 1992; Davenport 
et al. 1995). Importantly, the EU itself became a leading 
political-institutional voice among the preference pessimists, 
stating that:
trade preferences have neither halted the increasing 
marginalisation of the ACP region in world trade 
nor in their trade with the EU. Nor have they 
overcome the high dependence of the ACP on a few 
commodities. (DG TRADE and DG DEV 2002: 2)
This may be an accurate generalized description of 
outcomes, but what is contested by other perspectives is 
the explanation of their drivers, as illustrated in subsequent 
sections with particular reference to fish products. 
Augmented liberalizers 
In an important departure from the norm, the OECD 
(2003) qualifies the benefits of fish trade liberalization. 
It emphasizes that the liberalization of fisheries markets 
could deepen unsustainable resource extraction where 
management is ineffective and in areas, such as the high 
seas, where open access is prevalent. Similarly, Roheim 
(2004: 76) makes plain that fisheries management is ‘a 
necessary condition’ and ‘the most important factor in the 
outcome of liberalization of trade,’ because where stocks 
are not well managed, ‘liberalization will encourage faster 
depletion of the stocks.’ 
This qualified support for liberalization stems from 
production systems for fish being highly heterogeneous 
and subject to extensive levels of management, at least 
compared to other food products (Schmidt 2003). As such, 
the maximization of welfare heralded by supporters of 
tariff liberalization must be mitigated by attention to the 
sustainable use of fisheries, which depends, among other 
things, on the state of the resource and the ability of those 
charged with managing the extent and intensity of extraction 
(or barring it altogether) to do so effectively. In his major 
study of the effects of fish trade on low-income food-
deficit countries, John Kurien correctly noted: “discussions 
about sustainable trade attain meaning only in the context 
of commitments to sustainable production and sustainable 
consumption” (2005: 59).
DEVELOPMENTALISTS
The ‘developmentalist’ argument is that state interventions 
in the market can positively contribute to the prospects of 
economic development. They tend to take a historical view 
of the dynamics of capitalist development and highlight 
the centrality of tariffs and other forms of protectionism 
in the industrialization of Western Europe, the US, and 
parts of East Asia, arguing that ‘policy space’ is necessary 
for developing countries to diversify and industrialize 
their economies (e.g. Amsden 1989; Chang 2004; Wade 
1990). More specific criticism is re-emerging around the 
blanket use of comparative advantage as an overarching 
policy goal in promoting exports from the global South to 
promote economic development. The theoretical validity 
of comparative advantage is questioned in relation to the 
ever-increasing complexity of global value chains in capitalist 
development (e.g. Milberg and Winkler, 2013), especially 
in the context of high cost structures in small developing 
economies when comparative advantage ‘is not enough’ 
to support local development (Winters and Martins, 2004: 
347). There is considerable empirical evidence that without 
trade preferences and industrial policy economies dependent 
on fish processing would become non-competitive in 
international markets (e.g. Campling and Havice, 2007; 
Ponte et al., 2007; Campling, 2008; Havice and Campling 
2013). Arguments challenging the orthodox liberalizers are 
also taken forward by government officials and advisors, 
such as Argentina’s (then) Under Secretary for Fisheries 
who claimed that investment liberalization did not result in 
fisheries development in his country (Nieto 2006, see also 
UNEP 2002a) and a prominent advisor to the Pacific Islands 
3Forum Fisheries Agency who pointed out that deregulated 
investment in resource access is unlikely to have beneficial 
trade effects for the Pacific island countries (Clark 2006). 
Further, a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
study on Senegal found that with duty-free access to EU 
markets, local fishers’ switched their efforts to export-
orientated species, and this had negative implications for 
local food security (UNEP 2002b). 
In contrast to the preference pessimist position sketched 
earlier, the developmentalists tend to be ‘preference 
optimists.’ As opposed to the very general, highly aggregated 
data used by the pessimists, the ‘optimists’ base analyses 
on data disaggregated by value of preference, country, and 
product type and argue that Lomé preferences provided 
an important competitive advantage during particular 
historical periods for some countries and some products, as 
detailed in McQueen et al. (1998). However, exports must 
receive a ‘signiﬁcant’ margin of preference of ﬁve percent or 
more over other countries (Davenport et al. 1995: 67),3 but 
even a ﬁve percent margin can be considered commercially 
‘trivial’ (McQueen et al. 1998: 40). By the mid-1990s, over 
90 percent of total EU imports of manufactures entered duty 
free under MFN treatment or the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) regime (Grilli 1993); the largest exceptions 
were textiles and clothing and processed ﬁsh. However, 
particularly restrictive rules of origin (RoO) were applied 
to these very sectors, further constraining the economic 
beneﬁts of preferences (Campling et al. 2007; Naumann 
2010; Ravenhill 1985; and Stevens and Weston 1984). 
In sum, in order for a tariff preference to have a stimulating 
effect on the development of export-oriented production, it 
must provide a commercially significant advantage relative 
to major competitors; this in turn can only be understood 
in the historical context of competitive conditions in the 
world market, and the devil is in the legal detail on whether 
a preference is workable (e.g. RoO). Nonetheless, an OECD 
report found that preferences “can to some extent support 
developing countries’ efforts to move up the value chain and 
benefit more from trade” (Martini and Lindberg 2013: 6). It 
is precisely the argument of the preference optimists that 
frames the formal arguments of the ACP, Africa, and the 
least-developed country (LDC) and the small, vulnerable 
economies (SVE) groupings in non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA) negotiations at the WTO. 
ENVIRONMENTALISTS
There is a lack of careful studies on the environmental 
impact of fish tariff liberalization on stocks. In this context, 
some argue for caution against the liberalization of fish. For 
example, a sharp reduction in a tariff peak may incentivize 
production in areas where fisheries are poorly managed, 
and liberalization may even result in lower consumer prices 
sparking new highs of demand vis-à-vis other protein sources 
(ICTSD 2006: 33). However, while the globalization of 
markets for fish may increase demand pressures for trade in 
fish, does this necessarily increase fish extraction? In other 
words, is there contemporary evidence to show that the 
liberalization of a tariff resulted in the absolute expansion 
of extraction? Or, are we talking instead about a relative 
change, such as trade diversion where a protected supplier 
loses out (e.g. local boats being displaced by foreign ones, 
or a geographical shift in extraction from one fishing area to 
another)? (A discussion of the limited available evidence on 
the direct relationship between tariff liberalization and fish 
stocks is provided in the section on the case of canned tuna.)
Greenpeace makes the convincing argument that 
competition from cheaper imports may encourage a 
fleet to fish harder on already strained stocks (Allain 
2007). Moreover, and contrary to mainstream economic 
assumptions, boat owners are not always able to shift 
their capital to other uses. Thus, political pressure can be 
put on fisheries managers to continue access to maintain 
employment in socio-economically sensitive regions, as the 
OECD itself recognizes (2003: 24). 
In sum, there is very little doubt that the thrust of the 
environmentalist argument stands. Management of the 
resource must be based on the best available science and 
the precautionary approach where data are less robust. 
This does not suggest that one form of management is 
necessarily better than the other (e.g. single species vs. 
ecosystem, socially top-down vs. bottom-up, or input vs. 
output controls), but it is to say that in its absence the risk of 
resource depletion is certainly greater. 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
Bene et al. (2010) review the evidence for the benefits 
and costs of fish trade liberalization in Africa. They find 
that the debate is highly polarized but with little nuance 
— as typified by the three perspectives outlined above. 
They are particularly scathing on the use of insufficiently 
disaggregated data sets to make generalized claims. As an 
alternative, Bene et al. argue that analyses of international 
fish trade and development must engage with local 
specificities and deploy research methods that are suitable to 
capture both the local and national level dimensions of the 
problem. A similar argument is developed in Campling and 
Havice (2007) on the role of preferential trade for fisheries 
development in small economies. Havice and Campling 
(2013) emphasize the specificity of place, the environmental 
conditions of production and relative state capacity in 
making full use of trade preferences for fish products; and 
that — at first sight — the hidden costs of maintaining 
investment in a factory (e.g. direct and indirect subsidies) 
may call into question ‘development’ gains. Campling (2014) 
suggests that the relationship between trade preferences 
and development cannot be understood simply from the 
Corroborated by Manchin (2006) who found that ACP firms did not utilize 
preferences unless the margin was 4.5 percent more than the MFN rate.
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4TARIFF ESCALATION AND 
TARIFF PREFERENCES: 
STATUS
OVERVIEW
International trade in fish is heavily skewed toward the 
EU, Japan, and the US (the ‘global triad’). Combined these 
countries accounted for 64 percent of the value of world 
seafood trade in 2012, with the EU at 36 percent (including 
intra-EU trade) and Japan and the US at 14 percent each 
(FAO 2014: 50). It is apparent that, despite the emergence of 
a new ‘middle class’ (especially in parts of East and Southeast 
Asia) and its impacts of the direction(s) of world trade, the 
minority global population of residents of the triad remain 
dominant in terms of consumption of internationally traded 
fish. Therefore, this report focuses on the tariff regimes of the 
EU and the US given that Japan’s preference system is less 
significant in the structuring of global production and trade 
(Allain 2007; Campling et al. 2007).
Melchior (2006) distinguishes among three tariff rates: 1) 
bound at the WTO; 2) MFN applied; and 3) ‘actually applied,’ 
which includes goods traded under preference regimes or 
free-trade agreements (FTAs). Due to, among other things, 
the difficulty of measuring the third category using available 
databases,4 Melchior concludes that “there is no single true 
measure for the world tariff average for seafood” (2006: 9), 
not least because, as the OECD (2003) found, there is a lack 
of transparency on applied tariff rates among many countries. 
Tariff peaks
Only five OECD countries have MFN tariff rates at or above 
15 percent. Table 1 offers an aggregated picture of these 
for five OECD countries. The largest number of tariff peaks 
relative to the number of tariff lines is present in Korea and 
Mexico. In the EU, 128 of 394 tariff lines are at or larger than 
15 percent. The US and the EU peaks on canned tuna are 
both very high, respectively 35 percent and 24 percent (Table 
2). In Korea, a number of products carry a general 20 percent 
tariff. However, adjustment tariffs in Korea were used on a 
small number of products, lifting tariff peaks to 80 percent 
(e.g. frozen croaker) (OECD 2003).
Tariff escalation
Melchior (2006: 20) found that to the extent that there is 
tariff escalation (the globally aggregated data show mixed 
results), it is not used exclusively by OECD countries. A more 
concrete example of tariff escalation is provided in Table 2, 
which provides tariffs for tuna in the EU, Japan, and the US 
by Harmonized System (HS) code for unprocessed, semi-
processed, and processed tuna. Data are provided for a range 
of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and FTAs. Access to 
preference schemes is conditional on rules of origin (RoO).
TABLE 1:
Illustrative fish tariff differentiation in OECD countries by level of processing
Level of processing EU Japan US Korea Canada
Raw fish 10.3 4.3 0.6 15.3 0.6
Intermediate fish products 4.0 2.0 1.0 33.0 3.0
Processed fish 16.3 9.0 20.0 20.0 2.6
Source: Ahmed (2006) 
technical positions of the ‘pessimists’ or the ‘optimists’ 
and that trade policy formation — including preferences — 
needs to be understood historically. For example, the very 
existence of the ACP canned tuna preference (see below) 
was in the first instance a product of French industrial capital 
investing in colonial Senegal under the post-War French 
Union. Combined, these arguments call for sensitivity to 
complexity and contingency in the dynamics of change. 
More research is needed on the existing relationship 
between fish trade liberalization, industrial policy and job 
creation, poverty reduction, and food security, as opposed 
to policy prescriptions based on highly aggregated data 
and idealized assumptions either of perfectly functioning 
markets or of the ability of states to ‘direct’ economic 
outcomes with trade and industrial policy. To understand 
the effects of tariff escalation and preferences and their 
actual and potential liberalization, a variety of research 
methods and sources of evidence are needed. At a minimum, 
this would require combining quantitative analysis of the 
longitudinal relationship between fish production and trade 
and a range of policy mechanisms (e.g. tariffs, regulations, 
and government investment incentives), with the careful 
comparative qualitative study of value chains in strategically 
selected case studies of particular fish products and local 
social relations and contexts.
Data in WITS only show up for traded goods and thus cannot be used to 
identify applied tariff escalation where it successfully blocks the import of 
processed fish.
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5TABLE 2:
Simplified EU and US tariff schedules for tuna and tuna products (in % ad 
valorem unless otherwise specified)5
European Union
Product/ HS Code MFN GSP EBA GSP+ ACP
Fresh-Chilled Tuna/ 0302 0 (under 1604)
22 (other uses)
0 (under 1604)
18.5 (other uses)
0 0 0
Frozen Tuna/ 0303 0 (under 1604)
22 (other uses)
0 (under 1604)
18.5 (other uses)
0 0 0
Fresh-Chilled Fish Fillets/ 03048 15 14.5 0 0 0
Frozen Fish Fillets/ 0304 18 14.5 0 0 0
Prepared or preserved tuna (in 
oil)/ 1604
24 20.5 0 0 0
Prepared or preserved tuna (not 
in oil)/1604
24 20.5 0 0 0
Tuna in Pouches/ 160410 24 20.5 0 0 0
Tuna Loins for use under 1604/ 
1604 
24 20.5 0 0 0
United States
Product/ HS Code MFN GSP LDC GSP 
and AGOA
Caribbean 
Basin Initiative
Insular 
Territories6 
FAS7 FTAs**
Fresh-Chilled Tuna/ 0302 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Frozen Tuna/ 0303 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fresh-Chilled Fish Fillets/ 03048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Frozen Fish Fillets/ 0304 0 to 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
All: 0 
Except Korea: 2.4
Prepared or preserved tuna (in 
oil)/ 1604
35 35 0 0 0 35 All: 0
Except: Peru 14; 
Colombia 24.5;  
Korea 29
Prepared or preserved tuna (not 
in oil)/1604
6 to 12.59 6 to 12.5 0 0 0 0 All: 0
Except: Central 
America 0.1 to 
0.4; Panama 0.7 to 
1.4; Peru 2.4 to 5; 
Colombia 4.2 to 8.7; 
Korea 4.9 to 10.3
Tuna in Pouches/ 160410 12.5 12.5 0 0 0 0 As above
Tuna Loins for use under 1604/ 
1604 
1.1¢ /kg 
or 611 
1.1¢ /kg 
or 6
0 0 0 0 All: 0 
Except: Korea 
0.7¢ /kg or 4.2
*Expired on 31 July 2013; 
** Tariff treatment in 2014 (USTIC 2014a). Notes: The table uses MFN applied tariff 
rates, but several countries have now replaced this term with different ones, such 
‘normal trade relations’ (or NTR, for the US).
Adapted from Campling et al. 2007a. Updated USITC 2014
American Samoa and Puerto Rico.
FAS = freely associated states: the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Republic of Palau.
Tuna products are not always specified by species under this HS code. 
Instead they are assumed to fall under ‘Other.’
Prior to August 2002, tuna in pouches was not separately provided for in 
the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), it is now 1604.14.51/59/91/99. 
See USITC April 2004: 3.
1.1¢ for tuna loins in bags over 6.8kg each (HS code 1604.14.40). ‘Other’ = 
6% (1604.14.50).
US duties for canned tuna in water depend on a quota that limits imports 
from any single country to no more than 4.8 percent of the total tuna in air 
tight containers consumed in the previous year. The tariff rate for canned 
tuna ‘not in oil’ (e.g., in brine or spring water) shifts from 6 percent to 12.5 
percent when the tariff quota is full (USITC 2014).
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6FISH PRODUCTS AT THE WTO
Uruguay Round
At the scale of the multilateral system, there has been little 
harmonized movement in tariffs for fish since the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round. According to Finger et al. (1996 cited 
in Melchior 2006: 2) the average bound rate for fish and fish 
products after the Round was 5.2 percent, and the average 
MFN applied tariff was 4.4 percent. The OECD (2003: 80-
1) put the latter at 4.5 percent for developed countries, 
compared with the 6.1 percent in place before the Uruguay 
Round. Despite these reductions, EU MFN tariffs remain high: 
on imports of unprocessed fish, they are 11.8 percent and 
15 percent for semi-processed fish (in percent equivalent ad 
valorem). MFN tariffs for Canada were 1.4 and 5.6 percent, 
for Japan 3.2 and 8.1 percent, and for the US 0.1 and 6.5 
percent, all unprocessed and semi-processed respectively 
(Greenaway and Milner 1996: 30-31).
MFN applied tariff averages indicate that in general world 
fish trade is liberal compared with agriculture, but it is less 
liberal than trade in manufactured goods (Melchior 2006). 
However, applied MFN averages mask very high peaks 
for certain fish tariff lines and the importance of ‘actually 
applied’ tariffs (e.g. preferences and FTAs). As a result, the 
majority of this report focuses on particular categories of 
countries and specific product types (especially canned 
tuna). For example, while the average tariff level for fish 
in Canada and the US is about 1 percent (Melchior 2006: 
16), for canned tuna there are very high tariff peaks and an 
important system of trade preferences that contribute to 
shaping the global geography of canned tuna production (see 
below).
Doha Round
Fish and fish products are treated as industrial goods at the 
WTO and are thus grouped under NAMA negotiations. For 
most ACP countries, the key concern surrounding NAMA 
was a reduction of the preferential market access they 
have historically received into their main export markets 
(‘preference erosion’). In that respect, NAMA will force many 
developed countries to reduce their bound tariff rates. This 
will lower the relative value of the preference being received 
and effectively reduce the competitiveness of ACP exports. 
For fish products, a key aspect of a post-Doha trading 
environment and its impacts on the Cotonou preference can 
be surmised as follows. The current EU bound rate for canned 
tuna and tuna loins is 25 percent (only 1 percent more than 
the current applied MFN rate). If the range of the Swiss 
Formula coefficient that was under negotiation is applied to 
this,12 the post-NAMA EU bound tariff for canned tuna and 
tuna loins will be reduced to between 6.1 and 6.6 percent 
(see Table 3). In terms of the impact on the competitive 
advantage available to the ACP under the Cotonou 
Agreement and subsequent IEPAs, this translates into a 
reduction of over 70 percent in preference for exporters and 
an equivalent decline in their relative competitiveness. 
While some special treatment was proposed for those 
products for which the erosion of preferences for ACP 
exporters would prove overly damaging — including for EU 
imports of processed skipjack tuna (Annex 2 in JOB(07)/126) 
— the mechanism currently envisaged would only give an 
additional two years to spread out the reductions. After these 
TABLE 3:
EU import tariffs on canned tuna and tuna loins post-NAMA
Starting duty 25% Starting duty 25% Starting duty 25% Starting duty 25%
Formula coefficient 8 9
Year 1 21.22 22.30 21.32 22.37
Year 2 17.44 19.60 17.64 19.74
Year 3 13.66 16.90 13.96 17.11
Year 4 9.88 14.20 10.28 14.49
Year 5 6.10 11.50 6.60 11.86
Year 6 8.80 9.23
Year 7 6.10 6.60
Final EU tariff rate 6.10 6.10 6.60 6.60
Annual reductions 3.78 2.70 3.68 2.63
% cut overall 76% 74%
Source: Campling et al. 2007b
This is based on a coefficient value of 8 or 9, as proposed in the 17 July 
2007 proposed NAMA modalities document (JOB(07)/126) http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/markacc_chair_texts07_e.htm. 
The subsequent NAMA Chair’s text bracketed a coefficient of 8 (TN/
MA/W/103, 8 February 2008). 
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7two extra years, the products will arrive at the same tariff 
level that they would have if they had adhered to the five-
year implementation programme. Table 3 demonstrates that 
this marginal flexibility would do little to cushion the far-
reaching impacts of NAMA on EU canned tuna tariffs.
There was considerable pressure on the EU-ACP system 
of non-reciprocal trade preferences even at the outset of 
the Doha Round. At the WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha 
in 2001, Southeast Asian countries led by Thailand (the 
world’s largest exporter of canned tuna) opposed a waiver 
for the continuation of EU-ACP non-reciprocal trade in 
the preparatory phase of the Cotonou Agreement (2000-
2007) before Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
were due to be phased-in in 2008. The ‘Cotonou waiver’ 
was only granted, and the meetings in Doha concluded 
on the condition that the EU agreed to consult with the 
Southeast Asian countries on market access for their canned 
tuna exports in light of discrimination in favour of the ACP. 
The Southeast Asian countries were not satisfied with EU 
offers at meetings in 2001 and 2002 and requested WTO 
mediation in the dispute, which culminated in the allocation 
in early 2003 of a quota of 25,000 metric tons (mt) of 
canned tuna at 12 percent duty to Thailand, the Philippines, 
and Indonesia rather than the MFN duty of 24 percent (the 
‘Cotonou compromise’ tariff quota). This is an extremely 
important point, because EU buyers preferred the price of 
canned tuna from Thailand at 12 percent duty under the 
‘Cotonou compromise quota’ compared to the duty-free 
ACP product (Campling 2012a). This indicates that the ACP 
canned tuna industry would collapse, because it could not 
compete on price if NAMA were concluded using the Swiss 
formula coefficient detailed in Table 3. The flip side is that 
other developing countries would benefit, especially those in 
Southeast Asia that have a track record of high productivity 
in standardized fish processing.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the eventual conclusion 
of NAMA negotiations could possibly affect the degree of 
domestic tariff protection offered to the ACP (and other) 
tuna industry, as ACP governments would also be obliged 
to reduce import tariffs on NAMA products. With the 
lower coefficient currently being proposed for developing 
countries,13 Papua New Guinea (PNG) for example would 
potentially have to reduce its tariff for imported canned 
tuna from 15 percent to 8.8 percent or 20 percent to 10.2 
percent (Campling et al. 2007b). This could have significant 
competitive implications for firms that have strong domestic 
market elements in their business models. 
Fish and fish product sectoral
Parallel to NAMA negotiations, several ‘sectors’ were 
identified and targeted for more aggressive tariff reduction 
programmes. These mini-negotiations are known as 
sectorals. Fish and fish products were highlighted as a 
‘sector,’ because they face higher tariffs than many other 
NAMA products.14 
Several WTO members with an interest in fish and fish 
products worked on negotiating voluntary liberalization of 
fish and fish products to extend the scope of tariff reductions 
beyond NAMA outcomes. This proposal was supported 
by, among others, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the US; all of which are major fish 
catching, processing, and/or trading nations. While most of 
these players have low average tariffs for fish products, and 
we would thus expect political support for liberalization, 
because it would improve the relative international 
competitiveness of domestic industry, it is interesting that 
Thailand supported this sectoral despite applying relatively 
high tariffs (see Table 4). This is because Thailand is a major 
exporter of fish products (particularly shrimp and canned 
tuna, see below), and in the domestic struggle between 
those interests who support protection and those who want 
enhanced market access, the latter are more powerful (on 
Thai industry’s aggressive promotion of liberalization, see 
Campling et al. 2007a). Since sectorals are voluntary, not all 
members would be required to commit to comprehensive 
liberalization. 
‘Sectoral’ liberalization requires a ‘critical mass approach’; 
that is, members participating in the sectoral must represent 
approximately 90 percent of world trade of the product(s) in 
question. Also, unlike liberalization efforts undertaken using 
the Swiss formula, sectoral negotiations could eventually 
move the tariff level to zero. Resistance from major players, 
including Chinese Taipei, the EU, Japan, and South Korea, 
indicated that a fish sectoral was unlikely to progress, as 
the high average and maximum tariffs for fish for these 
players detailed in Table 4 would indicate. For example, the 
EU tuna lobby was strongly opposed, noting that the use 
of the Swiss formula already ignored the “specificities of a 
particular sector, such as canned tuna and the economic 
sensitivities of the producing countries” (EUROTHON 2006). 
Japan linked the ability to set fish tariffs to stock levels and 
fisheries management regimes, while Korea argued that tariff 
elimination could increase fishing effort (ICTSD 2006). In 
sum, there was never a great deal of momentum in the fish 
sectoral negotiations.
EUROPEAN UNION 
The EU is the largest market for seafood in the world. While 
it is only the fifth largest producer of seafood (5.5 million mt 
in 2011), it is the world’s leading importer (8.3 million mt) 
(EUMOFA 2014). Tuna is the highest volume commercial 
species consumed at 2.68 kg per capita, 2.14 kg of which is 
canned tuna. The next highest species consumed are cod 
(1.96 kg); salmon (1.72 kg); and Pollack (1.64 kg). Spain is the 
largest consumer of processed tuna products, while Italy is 
TN/MA/W/103, 8 February 2008 suggested a range of 20 to 25.
Draws from Campling et al. 2007a.
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8TABLE 4:
MFN applied tariffs for fish and fish products for selected countries in 2013
Country Average Tariff (%) Maximum Tariff (%)
Bangladesh 23.9 25
Brazil 10.3 32
Canada 0.9 11
Chile 6 6
China 10.6 23
Chinese Taipei 18.5 183
Colombia 14.4 15
EU 11.8 26
India 29.9 30
Indonesia 5.9 10
Japan 5.7 15
Korea, Rep. of 16.5 40
Country Average Tariff (%) Maximum Tariff (%)
Mexico 17.6 20
Myanmar 8.6 15
Norway 0.6 299
Pakistan 10.7 20
Peru 0.3 6
Russian Federation 12.3 76
South Africa 6.2 30
Sri Lanka 14.7 30
Thailand 11.4 15
Turkey 34.2 82
US 0.8 35
Vietnam 15.6 35
Source: WTO-ITC-UNCTAD (2014)
the highest value market, with prices averaging 20 percent 
higher than in other EU markets. There are also important 
differences among EU member states in terms of what type 
of canned tuna is generally consumed, with southern Europe 
being typified by yellowfin in olive oil and northern Europe by 
skipjack in brine. 
EU tariff peaks and escalation
Perhaps the most politically prominent example of tariff 
escalation and preferences in the EU is for canned tuna 
(Table 2). The 24 percent tariff peak on canned tuna is 
designed to protect EU-based processors — especially those 
based in Spain, Italy, and France (see Table 5). Spain is the 
major supplier to EU markets, closely followed by Ecuador 
(where the tuna industry is penetrated by considerable 
Spanish investment). While Italy, France, and Portugal 
are considerably smaller, they are significant players. The 
domestic-societal interests of canning firms and their 
employees are the principal factor in explaining the high 
tariff. A parallel policy of tariff escalation keeps raw material 
input costs low for EU-based processors and provides them 
with maximum flexibility for sourcing inputs at the lowest 
price on international markets. Importantly, processors based 
in preference-receiving countries, such as the ACP and GSP+ 
do not benefit from this flexibility, because the RoO require 
that they can only process fish caught by vessels owned 
by firms based in their countries or regions or the EU. This 
indicates that major beneficiaries of EU preference schemes 
are the European-owned boats that have a captive market 
among those ACP and GSP+ producers who do not have a 
domestic fleet (Campling 2008).
To save on labour costs, EU industry also imports pre-
cooked, frozen loins for inserting into cans. These are largely 
imported from developing country suppliers where labour 
is relatively less costly (Table 6) — what I call here a ‘logic 
of loining.’ Many of these suppliers benefit from duty-free 
access (e.g. GSP+), but they are unable to meet EU demand. 
As a result, the EU applies autonomous tariff quotas, which 
are non-discriminatory partial or full exemptions from import 
duties on a limited quantity of goods, aimed at providing EU 
industry with raw materials should EU-based suppliers not be 
able to keep pace with demand (Paredes 2006). For example, 
the EU Single Duty Loins Quota (introduced in 2004) allows 
for a set quantity of pre-cooked tuna loins to enter the EU 
duty free from third countries on a ‘first-come, first-served’ 
basis (in 2014 the quota was 22,000 mt). Typically, the quota 
is fully utilized by the end of the first quarter, although in 
2014 the quota was exhausted just ten days after opening 
– most likely taken up mostly by Thai processors, which are 
otherwise subject to pay 24 percent duty on loins (Campling 
and Havice 2014b). 
9TABLE 5:
EU import of canned tuna by major supplying countries in 1,000 mt.
TABLE 6:
EU import of tuna loins by major supplying country in 1,000 mt
 Country  Tariff regime  
(and % treatment)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Spain EU (0%) 74.6 102.8 97.2 86.1 86.4
Ecuador GSP+ (0%) 63.7 62.2 71.5 73.7 84.1
Thailand GSP (21.5%) 64.4 68.9 76.2 47.4 61.4
Seychelles IEPA (0%) 42.3 41.0 43.5 43.7 51.4
Mauritius IEPA (0%) 35.4 44.2 43.9 46.9 50.5
Côte d'Ivoire IEPA (0%) 31.5 26.3 25.7 34.6 33.5
Philippines GSP (24%) 54.1 45.5 35.7 31.1 29.9
Ghana IEPA (0%) 26.5 27.4 25.9 26.1 21.4
PNG IEPA (0%) 14.6 15.9 15.6 19.6 18.8
Indonesia GSP (21.5%) 11.3 9.2 13.4 14.6 14.0
Vietnam GSP (21.5%) 7.8 7.3 8.5 9.4 13.2
Italy  EU (0%) 13.3 13.8 13.9 13.0 11.6
Colombia GSP+ (0%) 12.7 11.4 13.3 12.2 11.5
France EU (0%) 12.2 6.4 5.9 6.5 7.8
Madagascar IEPA (0%) 7.3 6.8 9.7 8.0 7.7
El Salvador GSP+ (0%) 2.2 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.7
Portugal EU (0%) 2.3 2.4 3.9 3.5 3.7
Senegal EBA (0%) 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.1 1.7
Others Misc. 51.2 50.5 56.6 54.6 61.3
Total 529.2 545.7 564.0 534.5 573.5
Country Tariff regime (and % treatment) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Ecuador GSP+ (0%) 43.9 37.2 36.5 34.2 35.8
PNG IEPA (0%) 1.8 2.5 5.6 8.2 9.8
Thailand GSP (21.5%) and loin quota (0%) 16.9 12.2 16.4 7.9 9.1
Mauritius IEPA (0%) 11.7 12.6 11.7 11.7 7.7
El Salvador GSP+ (0%) 13.1 7.6 5.8 6.2 7.3
Guatemala GSP+ (0%) 5.7 8.7 7.2 9.1 7.1
China GSP (21.5%) and loin quota (0%) 4.5 5.4 6.5 4.1 6.8
Indonesia GSP (21.5%) 0.1 0.1 1.4 3.1 4.3
Spain EU (0%) 0.7 0.9 1.7 2.0 4.1
Solomon Islands EBA (0%) 2.2 1.9 4.3 4.5 4.0
Philippines GSP (21.5%) and loin quota (0%) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 3.4
Ghana Market access regulation/ IEPA (0%) 3.4 2.7 2.8 3.2 2.2
Kenya Market access regulation/ IEPA (0%) 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.3 2.0
Others 13.4 14.7 10.5 8.2 10.1
Total 120.7 110.1 114.9 107.0 113.7
Source: Globefish 2014
Source: Globefish 2014
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EU GSP
The EU GSP regime consists of three pillars:
a)  A ‘standard’ GSP scheme, which excludes only a handful 
of developing countries. For most fish products, tariff 
treatment under the ‘standard’ GSP used to be equivalent 
to the MFN tariff, but in January 2006 it was reduced by 
3.5 percent across a range of processed fish products (e.g. 
fillets, canned tuna).
b) the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which since 
2001 has provided quota-free, duty-free treatment for 
all goods (bar arms and munitions) from all countries 
categorized as LDCs 
c)  The GSP+ is available to countries that have signed and 
ratified a set of 27 international conventions both on 
labour and human rights and on environmental and 
good governance. On top of this, the country must 
be categorized as ‘vulnerable’ according to its level of 
export-oriented economic diversification. 
An important weakness of GSP schemes from the perspective 
of beneficiary countries is that they can be unilaterally 
reformed or rescinded (see section on the case of canned 
tuna for more on Ecuador and Maldives graduating from the 
EU GSP+ scheme). 
The GSP+ regime in particular had important effects on 
industrial tuna production in Latin America. Between 
1976 and 2003, the share of GSP Plus countries of world 
production of canned tuna grew from 3 percent to 9 percent 
(Oceanic Développement 2005: 114). The GSP+ (and the 
Drugs Agreement before it) provided the trigger for large-
scale investment by Spanish processing firms, investing 
hundreds of millions of euros in Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Venezuela. EUROTHON (the EU Tuna lobby 
group) estimates that its members alone (i.e. not all EU tuna 
processing companies are members) have created 35,000 
jobs in fishing and processing industries in Latin America (due 
principally to the incentive of the GSP) (EUROTHON 2006). 
EU-ACP relations
The EU administered an extensive preference scheme with 
the ACP under the Lomé Conventions (1976-1999) and 
the Cotonou Agreement (2000-8).15 This ended when the 
Cotonou Waiver secured at the outset of the Doha Round 
expired in 2008 (see above), which was to be replaced with 
a series of sub-regional EPAs. ACP exporters were able to 
access the EU market duty free compared with an MFN tariff 
of 24 percent (Table 2.). 
Export-oriented canned tuna production represents one of 
the few success stories of industrial ‘upgrading’ in the ACP 
under Lomé (McQueen and Stevens 1989; Campling 2012a). 
In aggregate terms, the ACP share of world production of 
canned tuna grew from 5 percent to 12 percent between 
South Africa’s trade relations with the EU were governed by the bilateral 
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), which was 
signed in 1999. Although together with several other Southern African 
states, it initialed an IEPA in July 2014, which is set to replace the TDCA.
Territorial seas as defined under United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982), Part II, Section II, Article 3.
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1976 and 2003 (Oceanic Développement et al. 2005), 
supporting the position that “the Lomé Convention was in a 
key sense the midwife in the creation of the … ACP canning 
industry” (Grynberg and White 1998: 68). Drawing upon 
their analysis of trade data to mid-Lomé IV, Davenport et 
al. found that fish was the most important non-oil ACP 
export to the EU and was “one of the most successful cases 
of processing in the ACP countries” (1995: 20; see also 
McQueen et al 1998: 48), referring to fish fillets, frozen 
prawns and shrimp, as well as tuna products. Total direct full-
time equivalent employment in EU-centred tuna processing 
facilities in ACP island states and coastal regions in the mid-
2000s (when EPA negotiations were in full swing) totalled 
over 15,000 workers: Côte d’Ivoire 3,000; Ghana 2,000; 
Kenya 800; Madagascar 1,300; Mauritius 2,700; PNG 3,000; 
Senegal 2,400; Seychelles 2,300; and Solomon Islands 1,000 
(Campling 2008). The indirect and induced employment 
produced by the activity of the factories is of course 
considerable (a multiplier of three is often used here). This 
is not to claim that the preference was the sole determinant 
in this process, but that it was an integral aspect of a set of 
necessary conditions. 
Preference-dependent fish processing secures export-
oriented employment and considerable socio-economic 
spin-offs, and it is often based on a resource extracted 
from national territory. Several ACP states engaged in the 
negotiation of reciprocal EPAs largely to maintain, previously 
non-reciprocal, preferential market access for a range of 
products, including for processed fish (e.g. processed hake 
from Namibia, Nile Perch fillets from east Africa). For 
example, continuing duty-free market access for canned 
tuna was a central reason for entering into an Interim 
EPA for PNG, and Seychelles, and it was a component of 
several other preferential items for Fiji, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, and Mauritius.
EU preferential RoO for fish
EU RoO for fish are based on ‘wholly obtained’ criteria. Under 
(Interim) EPAs and the EU’s current GSP regime, the wholly 
obtained criteria f or fish and fish products are that:
•	 All	 fish	 is	 automatically	 wholly	 obtained	 when	 caught	
inland and within the territorial seas (12 miles from 
the coast) of the signatories. The location determines 
origination.16 This can also include fish caught in 
a country’s archipelagic waters where the proper 
international legal procedures have been followed 
through the UN.17 
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•	 If	 caught	 outside	 of	 these	 locations,	 origination	 is	
determined by the ‘nationality’ of the boat (i.e. when 
caught in exclusive economic zones and in the high seas). 
Nationality is determined by: a) the boat being flagged 
and registered by one of the parties to the agreement; 
and, b) being at least 50 percent owned either by 
nationals of parties to the agreement or by a company 
based in one of the parties to the agreement. 
The ‘wholly obtained’ approach is the basis of all EU 
preferential RoO for fishery products in international 
preferential trade arrangements, including in the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement (and the Lomé Conventions before 
it).
The EU tuna fishing industry maintains that the RoO 
contributes to off-setting its higher cost structure compared 
to less heavily regulated competitors, especially in the realm 
of ‘social and environmental conditions’ (FITAG-Anfaco 
2011: 2; Estudios Biologicos 2006). From the perspective 
of preference-receiving trading partners, such as the ACP 
group, EU fisheries RoO have long been perceived as a source 
of contention due to their restrictiveness (Commission for 
Africa 2005; Davenport et al. 1995; Ravenhill 1985; Stevens 
and Weston 1984).
UNITED STATES
US tariff peaks and escalation 
US tariffs on fish and fish products are generally zero or very 
low except for products of commercial significance to US 
interests, such as fish fillets for certain species (6 percent); 
canned sardines (15-20 percent); canned tuna (6-35 percent); 
clam products (8.5 percent); ‘fish sticks’ (7.5-10 percent); 
and processed crab, other crustaceans, molluscs, etc. (7.5-
10 percent). These peaks are all for processed products. For 
raw material (fresh, chilled, or frozen fish), the normal trade 
relations (NTR) tariff is generally zero, indicating a classic 
policy of tariff escalation, except for 3 percent on a handful 
of species such as Alaska pollock, hake, seabass, and tilapia 
(USITC 2014). 
US tariffs on canned tuna and related products require 
detailed explanation (see Table 2). US duties for canned tuna 
in water (‘not in oil’, i.e. in brine or spring water) shifts from 6 
percent to 12.5 percent when a tariff quota is full. The quota 
limits imports from any single country to no more than 4.8 
percent of the total tuna in air tight containers consumed 
in the previous year. The US quota for tuna in water at 6 
percent is filled extraordinarily quickly. Several Southeast 
Asian and Latin American producers report that taking 
advantage of the quota is both costly and risky as product 
must be stored in bonded warehouses in the US in advance 
and there is no guarantee that it will qualify for the quota 
(Campling et al. 2007a; Havice et al. 2014).
Canned tuna in oil has a very high NTR tariff at 35 percent. 
The US tariff schedule for canned tuna is structured with 
a high duty on tuna in oil and a lower duty on tuna in 
water simply because “no one thought that anyone would 
ever be interested in buying tuna in water!” (US industry 
representative interview in 2006, cited in Campling et al. 
2007a: 2). The rise in health consciousness in the US from 
the 1980s onwards spurred the increase in consumption of 
tuna in water rather than in oil. Today, canned tuna in oil 
is a small market segment: at between 3.5 percent and 4.5 
percent of the canned tuna import market by volume in 
2011-12 (Havice et al. 2014). Without tariff protection of 
canned production offered to the two canneries based in the 
mainland US, these factories are highly unlikely to be able to 
compete with the costs of production in places such as the 
Philippines and Thailand.
Tuna loins for reprocessing under 1604 (i.e. to be defrosted 
and inserted into shelf-stable containers such as cans) are 
met with a NTR tariff of 6 percent when in bags of 6.8kg of 
less or 1.1¢ per kilogram when packed in bags of a higher 
volume (see Table 2). The US market for loins may only exist 
as long as US trade policy continues to protect domestic 
canners. (For more on the effect of this US tariff policy on the 
structure of global production). 
US GSP
The US GSP provided for duty-free access to developing 
country beneficiaries for most manufactured items with the 
exception, among others, of canned tuna where the NTR rate 
is applied (see Table 2). An extended GSP scheme for ‘least-
developed’ beneficiaries includes canned tuna in oil, in water, 
tuna loins, canned sardines and fish sticks (USTR 2012). 
However, the US GSP was not renewed by the US Congress 
when it expired on 31 July 2013 (Jones 2014). While 
supported by the Obama administration, it is not known if 
Congress will re-extend the GSP scheme. In short, given that 
the GSP is unilaterally granted, it can also be unilaterally 
withdrawn. 
Other US preference regimes
Insular Territories: US territories, such as American Samoa 
and Puerto Rico, receive substantial benefits in the US 
market. Fish processors in American Samoa do not pay 
any tariffs on the movement of goods to the US mainland, 
providing that products do not contain more than 70 percent 
in value of foreign components. The territory receives several 
additional benefits, including: an exemption by the United 
For example, Papua New Guinea obtained a redefinition of its ‘territorial 
sea’ to incorporate the sea surrounding its entire archipelago. To receive 
this status under UNCLOS (1982) Part IV, Articles 47-50, a country 
declares the waters sovereign and submits the claim to the Division of 
Oceans and Law of the Sea at the UN (a collection house for declarations). 
If there is no dispute, the declaration becomes law. Before Papua New 
Guinea’s application, no other state had made use of archipelagic waters in 
relation to the EU RoO.
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States Bureau of Customs from the Nicholson Act, which 
prohibits foreign vessels from landing or delivering fish in US 
ports; varying exemptions on taxes provided by the Federal 
and American Samoa governments; and the ability to supply 
US government procurement contracts for public schools, 
prisons, and the military (Campling and Havice 2007). The 
territory is, however, subject to federal minimum wage 
legislation, which is incrementally rising and is expected to 
meet that of the US mainland by 2027 (GAO 2014; Campling 
et al 2014a). American Samoa continues to take advantage 
of these benefits; however, in Puerto Rico the last remaining 
tuna processing plant was closed in 2012, because it was not 
commercially competitive.
The Andean Trade Preference Act and Ecuador: Introduced 
in 1991, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPDA) was designed to support countries transition 
from relative dependence on the production and trade in 
coca/cocaine. Made available to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Peru, the ATPDA provided duty-free access to the US 
market for almost all products except for canned tuna 
(among others). It did however provide duty free access for 
tuna in pouches compared to an NTR rate of 12.5 percent 
(Campling et al. 2007: 85-87; USTR 2013). This provided a 
commercially significant competitive advantage to producers 
in Ecuador, which emerged as the second largest supplier to 
the US of tuna in pouches after Thailand (Globefish 2014). 
The ATPDA expired after 31 July 2013 (USITC 2014: 24). 
It was dissolved because certain beneficiaries — including 
Colombia and Peru — signed bilateral FTAs with the US. 
However, Ecuador is yet to conclude long-standing FTA 
negotiations with the US. To compensate firms dependent 
upon the ATPA duty free preference for tuna in pouches, 
since July 2013 the Ecuadorian government is reportedly 
paying a direct subsidy to cover the tariff loss on these 
exports. However, this is scheduled to be phased out in mid-
2015 and industry does not expect to be able to compete 
with tuna in pouches from Thailand when entering the US at 
the same tariff rate (Havice et al. 2014).
Selected US FTAs
The US currently has 14 FTAs in force (USITC 2014). It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to detail the tariff treatment 
of fish products under each of these. Instead, three examples 
are selected because of their actual or potential relevance 
as suppliers of the fish products identified earlier as having a 
potentially commercially significant preference compared to 
NTR treatment (i.e. primarily processed tuna products). They 
are FTAs involving: Central America, Colombia, and Korea. 
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (CAFTA-DR) was 
signed in 2004. It entered into force for the US, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during 2006, for the 
Dominican Republic on 1 March 2007, and for Costa Rica on 
1 January 2009 (USITC 2014). CAFTA-DR already provides 
duty-free or extremely low duty for all processed tuna 
products entering the US market, subject to RoO. Several of 
these countries have a history of producing canned tuna and 
tuna loins, especially Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala, 
which together have a combined annual production capacity 
of 78,000 mt of raw material (Hamilton et al 2011a: 233). 
They also benefit from duty-free access to the EU under 
the GSP+ (see above). There are, however, concerns about 
worker abuses in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
and Honduras. The labour chapter and other clauses of the 
FTA are being used by the US in attempts to address these 
concerns (USITC 2014). 
The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) 
with the US entered into force on 15 May 2012. Previously, 
Colombia accessed the US market under the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA, see above). 
Under the ATPDEA and now the CTPA, Colombia has been 
exporting tuna loins duty free to the US (Hamilton et al. 
2011a; Campling et al. 2007a). However, the trade preference 
is fairly small as the NTR duty is 1.1 cents per kilogram. 
Exporters based in Colombia will be able to access the US 
market duty free by 2021, subject to RoO (see below).
The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) 
entered into force on 15 March 2012. For US tariff peaks 
on fish products, KORUS has one of the highest starting 
points of all of the US FTAs considered here. This may have 
been a defensive measure by the US government in KORUS 
negotiations to protect the US tuna fishing and processing 
industry, because Korean firms control a large fleet of tuna 
purse seiners (over 28 vessels) and long liners (about 150 
vessels) and Dongwon Industries — the largest canning firm 
in Korea — owns the principal US canned tuna brand, Star-
Kist. Canned tuna production in Korea is largely for domestic 
consumption (Hamilton et al. 2011a), but there are some 
exports to the US. This might be explained by the high tariff 
currently (in 2014) applied to canned tuna in oil (29 percent) 
and in water (post-quota: 10.3 percent), as detailed in Table 
2. With the phase out of these tariffs by 2021 (see Table 7), 
it is conceivable that Korea will export to the US; although 
Korea’s relatively high cost structure — especially labour — 
may act as a competitive disadvantage. 
US RoO for fish and fish products
Discrete RoO apply under different US preference regimes 
and FTAs. The following details a selection of these. For some 
arrangements, the RoO are spelled out in some detail, while 
for others only specific provisions are highlighted where they 
are different from the norm. 
US RoO under the GSP
There are two steps for manufactured goods in the US RoO 
for the GSP (USTR 2009):
1. The article must be the growth, product, or manufacture 
of the GSP beneficiary. For fish and fish products, 
‘origination’ is determined by whether the boat is 
registered or recorded in and flying the flag of the 
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beneficiary country or a member of a regional association 
or that of the US. It does not matter where the fish is 
caught — e.g. the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of any 
country or the high seas.
2. The sum of the cost or value of materials produced in the 
beneficiary country plus the direct costs of processing 
must equal at least 35 percent of the appraised value of 
the article at the time of entry into the US.
Imported materials can be counted toward the 35 percent 
value-added requirement if they are ‘substantially 
transformed’ into new and different constituent materials, 
which are then used to produce the eligible article (USTR 
2009).19 There are different ways of measuring ‘substantial 
transformation,’ including the change in tariff heading 
method (see below). 
US RoO under FTAs
The major difference from the GSP RoO is that under 
several of the FTAs reviewed here20 only a single substantial 
transformation is necessary to determine origination, e.g. via 
a change in tariff classification (CTC). For example, under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the ‘change 
in tariff classification rules’ for fish and fish products are as 
follows:
•	 Chapter	 3.	 A	 change	 to	 headings	 0301	 through	 0307	
from any other chapter.
•	 Chapter	 16.	 A	 change	 to	 headings	 1601	 through	 1605	
from any other chapter. (USITC 2014: 35 and 37)
However, other FTAs appear to mirror the two steps of the 
GSP RoO, i.e. requiring origination and 35 percent local value 
added (e.g. the US-Morocco FTA). 
TABLE 7:
Tariff phase out by year when zero is reached for processed tuna products for 
selected US FTAs
Product/ HS Code Central America Colombia Korea
Canned tuna (in oil)/ 1604.14.10 2015 2021 2021
Canned tuna (not in oil)/1604.14.22/ 30 2015 2021 2021
Tuna in foil pouches/ 1604.14.2218 NS NS NS
Tuna loins for use under 1604/ 1604.14.40/50 NS NS 2021
NS = not specified
Source: USITC 2014
Prior to August 2002, tuna in pouches was not separately provided for in 
the US HTS.
The same RoO apply under the Compact Agreement with the addition that 
the cost or value of materials produced in the customs territory of the US 
may be counted toward the 35 percent value-added requirement, but only 
to a maximum of 15 percent of the appraised value of the imported article 
(CBP 2006: 66)
The review includes summaries of RoO texts in USITC (2014) for Australia, 
Central America, Chile, Singapore and South Korea. See also CBP (2013) for 
a basic side-by-side comparison of RoO and related measures under US 
FTA and preference schemes. 
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TARIFF ESCALATION AND 
TARIFF PREFERENCES: 
EFFECTS
GENERAL EFFECTS
A recent systematic review for the UK Department of 
International Development (DfID) of existing evidence on 
the role of fisheries in development was inconclusive both 
on the relationship between international trade and food 
security and on the contribution of export-oriented fish 
trade to national and local economic growth (Arthur et al. 
2013). While the review did not include any research on tariff 
escalation and preferences in particular, it is worth repeating 
a few elements of the findings, because it speaks to the 
difficulties of doing careful applied research in the area. The 
review used strict criteria for the inclusion of research. 
Nine qualifying studies bar one on international fish trade 
and food security considered in the DfID review rested largely 
on secondary data sets and had no clear methodology. The 
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conclusions were relatively inconsistent, reflecting essentially 
the lack of tangible evidence and the subsequent unsettled 
debate on this issue. Some authors claim that international 
fish trade contributes to improving food security of 
developing countries through fish export revenues, while 
others claim that international fish exports threaten food 
security at the local level (Arthur et al. 2013). However, 
none of the studies demonstrate any correlation between 
fish export revenues and imports of food or improvements 
in food security at national or local levels. Such work will 
remain challenging without more reliable data on national 
and intra-regional trade in most of the developing world 
and the inclusion of a wider group of tropical fish species in 
international trade classification beyond those of commercial 
significance to the global North (see discussion in Campling 
et al. 2008).
Much like the pro-liberalizer position outlined previously, 
studies included in the DfID review that look at the 
contribution of export-oriented fish trade to national and 
local economic growth generally assume that exploiting 
rising demand in export markets is an unproblematic means 
of wealth generation (Arthur et al. 2013). This work relies 
largely on international data sets of fish trade flows and fish-
related revenue capture rather than evidence of the effects 
of these revenues on the national economy of the countries 
or the livelihoods of their populations. Contrary to this 
assumption, there is limited evidence that income from fish 
exports is actually redistributed and whether it is having a 
specific impact on poverty (e.g. Ponte et al. 2007; Arthur et 
al. 2010).
Outside of the DfID review, other studies at the local level 
do highlight, however, that the social relations of fisheries 
investment and trade are an important factor affecting 
the nature and distribution of benefits from fisheries and 
aquaculture (e.g. Platteau and Abraham 1987; Bush and 
Oosterveer 2007; Havice and Reed 2012). Each of these 
papers draw on local examples to argue that the wealth 
generated through trade is not necessarily invested back 
into the fisheries sector or to the regions from which the fish 
resources are being grown or extracted.
In light of the problems highlighted in the DfID review of 
making generalized assumptions based on ‘global’ snap shots, 
the rest of this section looks at available evidence of the 
effects of tariff escalation and preferences through concrete 
cases.
EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION STRUCTURES: THE 
CASE OF CANNED TUNA
Tariffs and the global geography of canned tuna production
The EU and US tariff regimes play a major role in shaping 
the structure of global tuna production. Figure 1 provides a 
snapshot of the international division of labour of canned 
tuna production. The figure depicts estimated production 
capacity of factories across the planet in the mid-2000s 
based on volume of tuna raw material capacity (i.e. whole 
fish or equivalent in loins of all canning-grade tuna species), 
but not necessarily actual output. Larger capacity is depicted 
with black symbols, while symbols for less significant 
locations of production are white. The square symbols 
represent primarily ‘canning only’ locations of production; 
the triangles represent specialized loining locations; and the 
circles represent full manufacturing from loining to canning. 
Canneries in Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific islands 
tend to focus on the EU market, largely as a direct result of 
tariff preferences, while those in Southeast Asia supply the 
US, Japan, and the EU. Canning only locations are all in the 
global North, and specialized loining takes place only in the 
South, largely in small developing economies — representing 
a fragmentation of production, based in large part around 
tariff policy. It should be emphasized that this aspect of the 
new international division of labour — the ‘logic of loining’ 
— is not solely about the search for cheap labour, but also 
for ready access to tuna fisheries, more lax labour standards 
and environmental regulations, and, importantly for this 
report, access to EU and US trade preferences and US fiscal 
advantages (for American Samoa). Since doing the research 
that fed into Figure 1, divestment saw Puerto Rico and 
Trinidad and Tobago stop producing, the Solomon Islands 
now produces predominantly loins, and China, PNG, and 
Vietnam now process annually more than 25,000 mt of raw 
material and would thus be represented by a black symbol. 
EU tariff protection and canned tuna production 
Spain is the most important producer of canned tuna 
within the EU, accounting for 59 percent of production in 
1998 and 68 percent in 2007. It is also the world’s second 
largest producer of canned tuna after Thailand, having 
apparently received a major boost from 1992 onward with 
the institutionalization of the EU single market (see Figure 2). 
Given highly competitive conditions in the Spanish market, 
this indicates the effectiveness of tariff protection combined 
with the various productivity-enhancing strategies of firms 
(Campling 2012a). Italy is the second largest producer in the 
EU (traditionally for domestic consumption) and is in decline, 
from 24 percent of total EU production in 1998 to 19 percent 
in 2007. Spain is now the leading supplier to the Italian 
market. Production in France has remained relatively stable, 
falling from 12 percent of the EU total in 1998 to 10 percent 
in 2007.21 Importantly, ready-made tuna salads constituted 
70 percent of all domestic production of ‘ambient’ tuna 
products in France in 2002 (Catarci 2004: 23).22 This aspect 
The fourth location of EU production is Portugal, which had a 6 percent 
share of the EU total in 1998, falling to 4 percent in 2007.
21
In the UK, ‘ambient’ product (‘shelf-stable’ in the US) refers to traditional 
canned products, as well as tuna in pouches and other so-called value-
added tuna products that can be kept in non-refrigerated conditions for 
long periods (i.e. on the supermarket shelf).
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FIGURE 1:
The geography of world canned tuna production
Source: Campling 2012a
FIGURE 2:
Canned tuna production in Spain, Italy, and 
France, 1976-2007
Note: EU production excludes Portugal
Sources: Campling 2012a (based on FAO Fishstat+ 
and Globefish 2010)
neatly encapsulates the international division of labour in tuna 
processing: this product type is considerably more profitable 
because of the significantly reduced use of the highest cost 
raw material (the tuna itself), and is the main explanation for 
the survival of ‘ambient’ tuna production in France.
US tariff escalation and the ‘logic of loining’ 
The US had the first and, for a long time, the largest tuna 
canning industry. It has always been protected by high tariff 
peaks. As competition emerged first from Japan and later from 
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SVEs and preference dependence
It is widely recognized that SVEs suffer from competitive 
disadvantages associated with their scale and geographical 
isolation. The US, and especially, EU tariff preferences have 
been instrumental in the development and survival of tuna 
processing facilities in SVEs in the Indian and Pacific oceans. 
However, despite some similarities, national experiences are 
highly differentiated. 
Countries like Mauritius and Seychelles are success stories in 
the preference optimist narrative. They specialize in processing 
EU-caught fish, and both signed an Interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement (IEPA) with the EU in 2007 to maintain 
Lomé/ Cotonou preferences. Mauritius largely produces 
canned tuna and tuna loins for the EU, but it also exports loins 
to the US under the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) preference scheme (Table 8). In 2007, the Mauritius 
Seafood Hub probably contributed between 2 percent and 3 
percent of GDP and generates about 15,000 direct full time 
equivalent jobs (Barnes and Campling 2008). The tuna cannery 
in Seychelles is dependent on preferential access to the EU 
market, is the largest private sector employer, and accounts for 
more than 90 percent in value of all goods exports (Campling 
2012a). Under the IEPA RoO, both countries are locked 
into processing EU-caught fish, which can result in supply 
problems during the down season in the Western Indian Ocean 
fishery. Although, in their IEPA they negotiated an automatic 
derogation for canned tuna (8,000 mt) and tuna loins 
(2,000 mt) that provides some supply flexibility (Campling 
2008b). This suggests that negotiating more flexible RoO (or 
derogations from RoO) is a useful adjustment mechanism for 
the ACP to deal with falling preference margins. Given the 
growing impact of FTAs on preferences, more flexible RoO in 
that context could help smaller producers enter value chains 
with better access to their old markets.
Thailand, other Southeast Asian Countries and Latin America, 
the US industry switched production to the US territories of 
American Samoa and Puerto Rico before making investments 
in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In 2001, Thailand 
overtook the US as the largest producer of canned tuna, and 
soon after Spain pushed the US to third place. It has been in 
relative decline ever since. 
The two canneries in the US mainland use only tuna loins in 
the production process and do not process any whole round 
fish. Importing loins not only outsources the labour-intensive 
process of cleaning fish to lower-cost production sites, unlike 
the EU where loins are met with a 24 percent MFN tariff, 
loins can be imported to the US market at low tariff rates 
(1.1¢ /kg or 6 percent, see Table 2). This means that loins 
can be sourced from multiple locations without concern 
about RoO or the need for tariff quotas. As a result, US-based 
processors can take advantage of diversified supply strategies 
— a ‘global ocean strategy’ (Table 8) — that involve a 
combination of supply contracts, long-term management 
contracts, and even direct financial investments in processing 
facilities around the world.
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CASE OF CANNED TUNA
The following provides a series of snapshots of evidence 
of the effects of tariff preferences for canned tuna on 
economic development under three categories: SVEs, 
preference dependence and domestication, and preference 
disadvantaged economies. The cases are not uniform, 
because the available evidence is not. Combined though, 
these vignettes serve to indicate the great diversity of 
trade relations and development outcomes from fisheries 
preference systems.
TABLE 8:
Yearly imports of tuna into the US, in 1,000 mt
 2010 2011 2012 2013
Thailand 26.8 24.7 20.1 22.1
China 0.0 6.2 11.0 14.3
Fiji 14.9 4.6 10.3 11.6
Colombia 5.0 6.9 13.9 9.5
Mauritius 4.9 8.6 5.8 7.5
Ecuador 0.1 0.9 2.7 0.7
Others 13.1 9.6 2.5 4.1
Total 64.8 61.5 66.3 69.8
Source: Globefish 2014
17
GSP+, with the EU accounting for about 60 percent of 
Ecuador’s total tuna exports (Atuna 2014b; Tables 2.3 and 
2.4 above). Tuna exports to the US are comprised almost 
entirely of pouches (with an MFN tariff of 12.5 percent, 
Table 2), which were duty free under the Andean Trade 
and Development Preferences Act (ATDPA).23 Ecuador has 
a large domestic fishing fleet that meets both EU and US 
RoO. However, Ecuador graduates from GSP+ status in 
2015, because its gross income no longer meets the EU’s 
reformed ‘vulnerability’ criteria. To counter the threat to 
export competitiveness, Ecuador signed a Free Trade and 
Development Agreement with the EU in July 2014, which 
provides preferential access for fisheries products, including 
tuna and shrimp (McCoy et al. 2014a)24. Similarly, the ATDPA 
expired at the end of 2012. Pouch exports only remained at 
prior levels, because the Ecuadorian government provided 
domestic industry with a temporary subsidy payment (over 
two years) that offset the cost of the duty (Havice et al. 
2014). This subsidy offers another example of how a country 
adapted to the loss of trade preferences. Whether or not it is 
an option that is sustainable is an empirical question (e.g. the 
direct subsidy to maintain employment may or may not be 
preferable to the provision of social welfare payments), but 
it certainly suggests a temporary adjustment measure that 
could be recognized by the multilateral trade system.
Another example of preference-dependent domestic 
development is the ‘Namibianization’ policy that attempted 
to overcome the legacy of racialized ownership from prior 
South African rule. The Namibian case is concerned mainly 
with hake and monkfish processed products and canned 
pilchards, along with small volumes of tuna (FAO 2007). 
These are predominantly exported duty free to the EU under 
ACP preferences, a situation that is set to continue with the 
initialling of an IEPA in July 2014. The policy of localizing 
ownership of fishing enterprises through discounted resource 
access fees doubled the employment of Namibeans through 
the 1990s (Armstrong et al. 2004). It also meant that boats 
are compliant with EU RoO. However, through a complicated 
web of preferential shares, proxy ownership and cross 
ownership, de facto Namibian control over fishing industries 
remains low, with foreign ownership remaining dominant, 
consolidated into a handful of large conglomerations 
(Manning, 2000; Melber 2003). 
In contrast, Fiji and the Solomon Islands both found in the late 
1990s that they could no longer compete in EU markets for 
canned tuna even with the Lomé preference and downgraded 
to solely processing loins: Fiji to the US market using foreign 
caught fish, and the Solomon Islands to the EU under the 
EBA using fish caught by its own fleet, albeit with supply 
problems due to seasonality and exports loins to the US 
to keep the factory moving (Campling 2012a; Havice et 
al. 2014). Both are seen as crucial sources of employment 
in otherwise isolated regions within these two countries, 
especially for women (Lambeth et al. 2004; Sullivan and 
Ram-Bidesi 2008). 
In the cases of Fiji and Mauritius, the ongoing supply of loins 
to the US market (which does not apply a tariff of major 
significance on tuna loins) suggests that there is a degree of 
cost competitiveness to labour-intensive processing in these 
two SVEs (Table 8). However, given that US tariff escalation 
on canned tuna in effect creates the market for pre-cooked 
frozen loins, the market for loins will exist only as long as 
EU, Japan, and US trade policy continues to protect their 
domestic canning sectors. 
A good example of the risks associated with reliance on 
unilateral preferences like the GSP is Maldives. A major 
beneficiary of the EBA, duty-free access to the EU market 
supported two canned tuna factories supplied by a huge 
local small-scale fleet. However, Maldives graduated from 
LDC status in 2011 and was removed from the EBA in 
2014. Without this preference, its exports appear to be less 
competitive, as evidenced in a 40 percent drop in exports 
over the first half of 2014 compared with the same period 
in 2013. Instead, Maldives is exporting more of its Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC)-certified fish to Thailand for 
export-oriented processing to the EU (Atuna 2014a). 
According to the logic of the pro-liberalizers, this is the most 
efficient outcome, as comparative costs are minimized. 
However, given that tuna processing is a large employer 
of low-skilled labour and the Maldivian economy is yet to 
substantially diversify beyond tourism, it is unclear where 
the next round of jobs will come from. It is plausible that the 
Maldives will emerge as a supplier of specialized intermediate 
goods (e.g. whole tuna or loins certified by the MSC) to 
producers with competitive scale economies in processing, 
such as Thailand. 
Preference dependence and domestication 
Larger coastal states have tried to leverage the combination 
of market access opportunities presented by tariff 
preferences and access to rich fisheries in their EEZs to 
encourage local and/or foreign investment in onshore tuna 
processing. 
Ecuador is the world’s second largest export-oriented 
tuna processor and a major example of preference-related 
fisheries development, much of which is domestically owned 
(Hamilton et al. 2011a; Globefish 2014). It is dependent 
on both EU and US trade preferences, particularly the 
Ecuadorian producers also export small quantities to the Latin American 
market, to which they have duty-free access either through bilaterals or the 
Andean Community FTA, but they are experiencing competition from Asian 
producers, especially Thailand, which has duty-free access to the Peruvian 
market (Havice et al. 2014).
Together with Colombia and Peru, Ecuador was originally part of 
negotiations of the EU-Andean Community Free Trade Agreement, which 
commenced in 2007. In mid-2009, Ecuador opted to withdraw from 
negotiations, owing to conflicting concerns related to the agreement itself, 
as well as a long-running dispute with the EU over banana tariffs. With 
reforms to the EU’s GSP scheme in 2012 resulting in Ecuador graduating 
from the GSP+ and losing duty-free access from 31 December 2014, 
Ecuador utilized a provision in the Andean Agreement that enabled it to 
recommence negotiations (Havice et al. 2014).
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and unregulated (IUU fishing) and comply with GSP+ 
requirements on labour standards, or whether the domestic 
fleet can source sufficient volumes of EU RoO-compliant fish 
(Campling et al. 2014; McCoy 2014b).
A preference disadvantaged case study of quite a different 
sort is South Korea. Despite being one of the world’s largest 
tuna fishing nations, the domestic processing sector largely 
focuses on the national market. For example, a 20 percent 
tariff on canned tuna helps one Korean company (Dongwon) 
control 70 percent of the domestic market, with the rest 
absorbed by local competitors (Park and Roh 2006 Hamilton 
et al. 2011a). The same firm also owns the number one canned 
tuna brand in the US. This may explain why the US-Korea FTA 
has particularly strict RoO for canned tuna. Under NAFTA and 
the US-Australia FTA, a simple change in tariff classification 
meets origination, but in the US FTA with Korea there is a very 
specific rule for canned tuna blocking the CTC method. 
EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
Most studies that deal with the environmental effects of trade 
liberalization on fish stocks are focused on fisheries access 
regimes, especially those of the EU in Africa (e.g. Alder and 
Sumaila 2004; Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002; Mbithi Mwikya 
2006; UNEP 2002b, 2006; Walmsley et al. 2007; Acheampong 
1997; European Parliament 2001; Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002; 
Lankester et al. 2001; Tarte 2002; ACP 2003; Bartels et al. 
2007; Earle 2006; Gorez and O’Riordan 2003; Campling et 
al. 2012). There is very little evidence that identifies a direct 
effect (positive or negative) of tariff policy on a fish stock or 
stocks. The impact of liberalization on fish stocks, at least in 
theory according to the OECD, should depend on the supply 
response (harvest, processing capacity) to a change in price 
(tariff reduction). This depends on a whole range of factors, 
including the state of the affected stocks and how well they 
are managed. But, there is very little evidence of whether or 
how the theory applies in reality, and given the heterogeneity 
of fisheries and country situations the impacts will be very 
different in different places. 
Logically, in the cases of tuna fisheries across the planet, it is 
extremely unlikely that tariff escalation or preferences have 
been a principal causal mechanism contributing negatively to 
the sustainability of the fish populations. This is because in 
each case the fish species is valuable regardless of the tariff 
regime and a competing player would replace the incumbent 
should the tariffs be liberalized. 
In more recent years, others have tried to follow the 
strategy of fisheries domestification, most prominently 
PNG. Due to a combination of geographical isolation and 
other costs of doing business, processed tuna exports from 
PNG are dependent on duty free access to the EU market. 
In addition to the EU preference, a major explanation for 
onshore processing investment in PNG is ‘second generation’ 
fisheries access: by committing to onshore investment, 
foreign firms are allocated considerably more fishing 
licenses than necessary to supply that plant, offering long-
term strategic resource access (Hamilton et al. 2011b). 
Nonetheless, the tuna industry provided about 1.2 percent 
of all formal monetary jobs in PNG in 2008 (Gillett 2009), 
with a disproportionate impact on women — about 3.3 
percent of all formally employed women work in onshore 
tuna processing jobs (Sullivan and Ram-Bidesi 2008) — and 
together with net purchases in local businesses generates 
considerable net income to the economy (Hamilton et al. 
2011b). A major constraint on deepening this development 
process was the EU RoO, which meant that there was 
“insufficient wholly obtained fish to meet on-land demand 
[given] the very limited fishing capacity of the Pacific states’ 
fishing fleet” (PACP-EU IEPA, Protocol II, Article 6.6(a)). As 
such, the negotiation of ‘global sourcing’ RoO25 in the Pacific 
ACP IEPA provided a necessary component for increased 
investment in onshore processing capacity, ostensibly to 
export fish products to the EU. A study commissioned by the 
European Parliament (2012) estimates that new investment 
stemming from the reformed RoO will see PNG’s local 
benefits from tuna processing grow from USD 21 million in 
2012 to USD 70 million by 2018 and employment increase to 
20,000. As noted earlier, reform of RoO could be seen as a 
very important adjustment measure to help countries retain 
some competitiveness as preferences fall.
Preference disadvantaged economies
Finally, and very briefly, it is worth highlighting some cases 
that do not benefit from significant trade preferences. The 
most prominent case in the canned tuna industry is Thailand, 
which is the world’s largest producer but with only very 
limited preferential market access. Even if it did benefit from 
a commercially significant preference,26 Thailand would 
not be able to benefit, because it imports about 85 percent 
of its tuna raw material, valued at approximately USD 1 
billion; thus, its product would not meet EU RoO (Hamilton 
et al. 2011a). The country has FTAs only with Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan, none of which is among its top 
three markets for fish products. As a result, depending on 
market and product type, Thailand pays between 6 percent 
and 35 percent duty to access its most important markets 
for canned tuna (Table 2). While it has shown it can clearly 
compete at these tariff rates, competition will continue to 
deepen as other countries secure preferential market access. 
Of particular concern to Thai industry is the Philippines 
obtaining GSP+ status.27 The Philippines was awarded GSP+ 
status in December 2014, but critical questions still face its 
tuna industry, including whether it can address shortcomings 
identified in national efforts to fight illegal, unreported, 
This rule permits Pacific - African Caribbean Pacific (PACP) signatories to 
the Interim EPA to source fish from any vessel regardless of flag or where 
caught, provided it has been ‘substantially transformed’ by a PACP-based 
processing facility. In technical RoO terms, this is a CTS method.
It does qualify for a 3.5 percent advantage over the EU MFN rate under the 
‘standard’ GSP (Table 1)
Pers. Communication, Thai Industry Representative, 22 May 2014.
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An official of the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
stated at an OECD workshop that “Tariff escalation may 
generally lead to more pressure on the stocks to maintain 
revenue rather than the other way around” (Genee 2006: 
182). There is some evidence that dependence on fish 
exports is correlated with the over-exploitation of stocks 
(Roheim 2004), but factors other than tariffs are at play 
too. As Heydon of the OECD points out “fishers catch what 
nature and fisheries managers allow” (2006: 119).
It is widely acknowledged that dependence on fish exports 
for foreign exchange, local employment, and government 
revenue has accompanied the over-exploitation of fish 
populations (e.g. Roheim 2004). But, this is not the same 
as saying that liberalization of import tariffs per se caused 
over-exploitation. As we have seen, markets may be highly 
protected (e.g. the EU and US markets for canned tuna) 
but low cost production is still able to penetrate them 
despite tariff peaks (e.g. Thailand). Thus, the problem is not 
necessarily liberalization but a concert of factors, including 
the state of the affected stocks, fisheries management, 
domestic development policy, firm strategies, etc. 
There is some evidence that tuna production networks 
produce environmental pollution, with negative implications 
for coastal fisheries and local food security. This includes 
reports in Pacific island countries of incidents of inadequate 
waste water treatment, e.g. where plants ran out of 
chemicals or faulty plumbing resulted in waste washed 
ashore (Barclay 2010; Havice and Reed 2012). There has 
been considerable study of the environmental effects of 
canned tuna production in PNG in particular, largely owing 
to Spanish industry complaints about ‘global sourcing’ RoO 
in the Pacific ACP IEPA. But, even in these highly detailed 
single case study analyses, it proved difficult to demonstrate 
a direct correlation between trade policy and negative 
resource impacts per se (Hamilton et al. 2011b; European 
Parliament 2012). While there may be problems with 
fisheries management in general, global sourcing may have 
reduced pressure on sensitive areas. Previously, PNG obtained 
a redefinition of its ‘territorial sea’ to incorporate the sea 
surrounding its entire archipelago to meet prior EU RoO. In 
principle, global sourcing RoO removed pressure from these 
waters, although this is complicated by PNG having an 
exemption from the regional licensing system — the Vessel 
Day Scheme — for boats in these waters.
CONCLUSION 
Most commercial capture fisheries species are at or beyond 
their sustainable limits. Using the case of canned tuna, 
this report argued that tariff regimes are about capturing 
a relative share of the already fragile pie by influencing the 
location of production by raising or reducing costs vis-à-vis 
competitors, they are not about expanding the pie to new 
limits. This report has argued that the impact of preferences 
cannot be understood without taking into account the 
particular characteristics of the beneficiary country. 
Environmental change; local state policy (e.g. concerning 
resource access); distant water fleets; multinational firms and 
other investors; organized labour; civil society and NGOs; 
and donors can all play a role in shaping the development 
possibilities associated with commercially viable trade 
preferences. This makes general recommendations 
difficult. One thing is clear: there is a need for sensitivity to 
complexity and contingency in understanding the dynamics 
of change. As the OECD (2006: 53) points out: 
The development of fisheries, including management 
and trade aspects (policies, institutions and 
processes), should be conceptualised as a process 
which can change (positive/ negative) over time and 
can be influenced by a range of factors (endogenous/ 
exogenous), leading to different outcomes. 
This certainly suggests that one-size-fits-all policy 
prescriptions based on simplistic assumptions about the 
functioning of the world economy will not alone suffice 
as a policy framework. At a minimum, there needs to be 
more attention to careful differentiation among countries’ 
interests, recognizing that “trade and development 
policy may not be coherent for all developing countries 
concerned”(OECD 2006a: 52).
Arguments both for and against the liberalization of fish 
tariffs are all too often ideologically driven generalizations 
and need to be tested against objective evidence to help 
devise appropriate policy responses or amend existing 
policies to achieve the overall social objectives in this area. 
In this context, previously cited perspectives which qualify 
the benefits of fish liberalization are significant. Ideology 
aside, the real point here is that new trade arrangements 
are changing the competitiveness of preference recipients. 
As this report has shown, tariff preferences and escalation 
have had an important impact on tuna production and 
processing activities, shaping the international division of 
labour. The question is what can be done to counter or ease 
the adjustment if preference-dependent production becomes 
non-competitive. Preference erosion is an especially sensitive 
concern for SVEs, where few alternatives for large-scale 
private sector employment exist beyond fish processing.
A major change in the late 2000s was the move of the ACP 
from the non-reciprocal preferences of Lomé/ Cotonou to a 
network of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the form of 
reciprocal EPAs. (A handful of ACP economies categorized 
as LDCs benefit from the EU’s preferential EBA scheme, 
most notably the Solomon Islands.) By 2015, non-LDC fish 
exports from the ACP to the EU no longer utilized non-
reciprocal preferences, but they did continue to depend on 
duty-free market access under EPAs to compete with lower-
cost producers, especially in Thailand, which continues 
to be hit with a 21.5 percent to 24 percent tariff. This was 
evidenced by EU buyers scrambling for canned tuna from 
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Thailand at 12 percent duty under the ‘Cotonou compromise 
quota,’ suggesting that the ACP canned tuna industry could 
not compete on price if Thailand negotiated a reduced 
tariff under a RTA with the EU. It is not yet known whether 
the Philippines’s graduation to the GSP+ will divert trade 
from the ACP and other GSP+ countries, but it is certainly 
a prospect. In any event, it is clear that significant tariff 
liberalization by the EU would make canned tuna exports 
from the ACP and GSP+ non-competitive vis-à-vis relatively 
lower-cost production in Southeast Asia. 
A number of trade-related measures to adapt to this 
changing environment were suggested in this report. Five 
are re-iterated here with the earlier caveat in mind on the 
problem of generalized recommendations in the face of 
complexity and contingency. The first recommendation 
extends from this caveat: blanket, one-size fits-all 
policymaking will not work, especially for fisheries trade. 
Disaggregation and context are necessary for evidence-based 
policymaking to take account of species- and country-specific 
dynamics. Second, there should be no confusion about the 
positive linkages between good fisheries management and 
environmental effects. Therefore, given the current lack of 
evidence on the effects of trade liberalization on fisheries, a 
first principle in thinking through fisheries trade policy must 
be the precautionary approach. Third, as the competitive 
advantage offered by tariff preferences falls in major markets 
with the growing network of RTAs, public and private 
standards are likely to become the main market access 
constraint for fish products from preference-dependent 
countries. Financial, technical, and institutional support from 
home governments; donors; and (where appropriate) lead 
firms, such as big brands and retailers is necessary to spread 
the costs required to comply with standards, especially for 
smaller producers. Fourth, evidence from PNG suggests that 
negotiating more flexible RoO (or derogations from RoO) 
under preference schemes and RTAs is a useful adjustment 
mechanism for preference-dependent producers to deal 
with falling preference margins. Given the growing impact of 
RTAs on preferences, more flexible RoO could help bolster 
smaller producers in global value chains. However, given that 
the distributional impacts of RoO benefit fishing interests 
from preference-allocating states (e.g. the EU), there will 
be considerable opposition to greater flexibility. Finally, the 
experience of Ecuador’s loss of preferential access to the 
US market with the expiration of the ATDPA shows that 
unilateral allocations cannot be relied upon. It also shows 
how one state responded to preference erosion: the public 
provision of temporary subsidies to the private sector to 
offset the cost of the US import duty. Adjustment measures 
such as this could be recognized by the multilateral trade 
system as legitimate responses to preference erosion.
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